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INTRODUCTION 
In order to ensure respect for foreign investors’ rights1 and thus 
promote investment in developing countries,2 the World Bank 
operates the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“ICSID” or “Centre”).3 ICSID facilitates resolution of 
disputes that arise over investments governed by bilateral investment 
treaties (“BITs”) and free trade agreements (“FTAs”),4 pursuant to 
 
 1. See Brigitte Stern, ICSID Arbitration and the State’s Increasingly Remote 
Consent: Apropos the Maffezini Case, in LAW IN THE SERVICE OF HUMAN 
DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FLORENTINO FELICIANO 246, 247 (Steve 
Charnovitz et al. eds., 2005) (posing the problem of “judge and party,” in which 
the state acts both as a contractor and as a judge and thus cannot guarantee 
fairness).  
 2. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States pmbl., Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 
159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention] (discussing the role private international 
investment plays in economic development). 
 3. See ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules Intro, Apr. 10, 2006, 
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp [hereinafter 
ICSID Rules] (stating the World Bank administers ICSID through the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development). 
 4. See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Isr.-Czech Rep., art. 2(2), Sept. 23, 
1997, 2078 U.N.T.S. 297 [hereinafter Israel-Czech Republic BIT] (guaranteeing 
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the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention” or 
“Convention”).5 To do so, it provides the institutional infrastructure 
necessary for administering binding arbitration.6 
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention extends the Centre’s 
jurisdiction to “any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment[] between a Contracting State . . . and a national of 
another Contracting State . . . .”7 Because member states can 
determine the classes of disputes that they would be willing to 
submit to ICSID,8 the Convention leaves undefined what, in fact, 
constitutes an “investment.”9 Consequently, ICSID tribunals have 
wrestled with whether to apply an objective or a subjective standard 
when evaluating claims.10 
In April 2009, two ICSID tribunals once again split over the 
definition of the term “investment.”11 The tribunal in Phoenix Action, 
 
investors of each Contracting Party “fair and equitable treatment . . . in the territory 
of the other Contracting Party”). 
 5. See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.K.-Malay., art. 7(1), May 21, 
1981, U.K.T.S. 16 (1989) [hereinafter U.K.-Malaysia BIT] (bestowing exclusive 
jurisdiction upon ICSID “for settlement . . . [of] any legal dispute” arising under 
the BIT). 
 6. See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 45 (2009) (noting the Centre does not arbitrate disputes itself). 
 7. ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 25(1). 
 8. See id. art. 25(4) (affording Contracting States the ability to opt out of any 
class of disputes to which they do not consent provided that they make their 
disapproval known in advance). 
 9. See Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 1965, 1 
ICSID Rep. 28, 28 (1993) [hereinafter Report on the Convention] (suggesting that 
requiring consent by both parties makes defining “investment” itself unnecessary). 
 10. Compare Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARN/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001), reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003) 
(holding all “investments” have certain objective and “interdependent” hallmarks: 
(1) contribution, (2) “duration of performance,” (3) “participation in the risks of 
the transaction,” and (4) “contribution to the economic development of the host 
State”), with Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 
¶¶ 307-13 (July 24, 2008) (employing a broad subjective standard to define 
“investment” so as to include city water shares and shareholder loans). 
 11. Compare Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 85 (Apr. 15, 2009) (maintaining Salini’s objective standard 
but only requiring inquiry into the “contribution of an international investment to 
the economy,” rather than the development of the host State), with Malaysian 
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Ltd. v. Czech Republic12 elected to employ an objective standard for 
investment. Building upon the ubiquitous Salini hallmarks, the 
tribunal added the requirements that the assets be invested in 
accordance with the laws of the host state and bona fide.13 Yet in an 
annulment granted merely a day later, the ad hoc committee in 
Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. Malaysia (MHS)14 
minimized the importance of the Salini criteria, stating that they were 
not “fixed or mandatory as a matter of law.”15 Using a subjective 
standard, the it defined “investment” based almost entirely on the 
term’s definition in the applicable BIT.16 Since neither the 
Convention nor international law incorporates the concept of stare 
decisis, this vacillation will likely persist.17 
This Comment analyzes the bases of ICSID tribunals’ authority to 
define “investment” given the Phoenix tribunal’s supplementation to 
the Salini factors, and the MHS tribunal’s rejection thereof.18 After 
concluding that Article 25 of the ICSID Convention requires that 
tribunals assign an expansive definition to the term “investment,” the 
analysis shifts to the Phoenix tribunal’s failure to apply basic 
principles of equity and international law in reaching its decision and 
to the MHS tribunal’s correct derivation of “investment” from both 
the ICSID Convention and the U.K.-Malaysia BIT.19 This Comment 
contends that, in order to sufficiently eliminate legal risk and induce 
private international investment, ICSID tribunals’ jurisdiction over 
investment disputes must lie in the intersection of its Convention and 
applicable member states’ BITs and FTAs.20  
 
Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision 
on the Application for Annulment, ¶¶ 60-61 (Apr. 16, 2009) [hereinafter MHS 
Annulment] (discarding an objective standard and imposing a no “development” 
requirement). 
 12. ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5. 
 13. Id. ¶ 143 (basing its decision on the principle of good faith). 
 14. MHS Annulment, supra note 11. 
 15. Id. ¶ 79 (quoting Biwater Gauff) (finding no overly strict interpretation was 
necessary). 
 16. See id. ¶ 60 (concluding that a salvage contract is an “investment”). 
 17. See SCHILL, supra note 6, at 288-93 (postulating that, in the absence of 
internal control mechanisms, inconsistent decisions should abound). 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.A (concluding no “development” requirement is 
necessary). 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 20. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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Part I of this Comment discusses the historical basis for the 
protection of foreign investors’ rights and ICSID’s role in the 
protection thereof by providing an accepted channel of redress.21 Part 
I also establishes the Centre’s jurisdiction for arbitration of 
investment disputes and explains the rulings in Phoenix and MHS.22 
Part II analyzes the jurisdiction of those two ICSID tribunals, given 
their seemingly incongruent definitions of investment, under the 
applicable international instruments. Part III recommends that great 
deference be given to parties’ contractual definitions of 
“investment.”23 It also calls for the creation of some form of 
precedent, at minimum a jurisprudence constante, thereby yielding 
regularity in tribunal decisions and eliminating needless arbitration.24 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE ORIGINS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND THE  
 CREATION OF ICSID 
Before the establishment of international investment arbitration, 
injured foreign private persons, including corporations, could seek 
redress for a violation of their legal rights, such as contract 
interference or expropriation, only through diplomatic protection.25 
Diplomatic protection was born out of the simple fact that a private 
person lacked standing to raise an international claim in its own 
right.26 In order to overcome this obstacle, a state would take up a 
claim on its citizen’s behalf.27 A valid claim presented a violation of 
 
 21. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 22. See discussion infra Parts I.B-C. 
 23. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 24. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 25. See generally Marek Jeżewski, There Is No Freedom Without Solidarity: 
Towards a New Definition of Investment in International Economic Law 2-4 
(Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 51/08, 2008), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-Inaugural-Conference.html (elucidating the 
protections given to individual investors under two classical schemes: minimum 
protection and the Calvo Doctrine). 
 26. See Peter Muchlinski, The Diplomatic Protection of Foreign Investors: A 
Tale of Judicial Caution, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 341, 342-43 (Christina 
Binder et al. eds., 2009) (asserting that individuals lack the capacity to bring claims 
as they are not the subjects of public international law). 
 27. See id. (acknowledging that, while the claim is predicated upon legal 
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the individual’s rights under international law.28 These rights were 
determined under minimum protection or the Calvo Doctrine. 
Minimum protection required that host nations accept international 
norms on property and personal rights.29 For developing nations 
whose laws were not as expansive, the Calvo Doctrine provided an 
attractive alternative.30 It required a national treatment standard 
where, for example, aliens were at most afforded the same rights as 
nationals.31 While many remnants of the Calvo Doctrine still exist in 
trade agreements,32 movement in favor of developing countries, such 
as applying the laws of the less protective state, has been limited.33 
Because disputing nations asserted their respective standards of 
protection and the national state retained discretion to pursue the 
claim,34 diplomatic protection proved unworkable in the context of 
private international investment.35   
 
fiction (the primary rights giving rise to the claim are the citizen's), international 
law endows the national state with discretion in pursuing the claim). See generally 
Jeżewski, supra note 25, at 3 (premising a state’s claim on its resident’s behalf on 
the idea “that an alien who leaves his State carries with him the protection of his 
State”). 
 28. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 10-12 (2009) (citing the 
international consensus that foreign nationals possessed rights under customary 
international law). 
 29. See id. at 12 (stating this requirement imposed the law of “civilized” 
nations, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, on developing 
nations). 
 30. See JAMES C. BAKER, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LESS DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES: THE ROLE OF ICSID AND MIGA 90 (1999) (explaining the premise of 
the Calvo Doctrine is to assert that the imposition of foreign law is an 
impermissible interference in the internal affairs of the host state). 
 31. See id. at 91 (adding that Calvo clauses, the contractual embodiment of the 
Doctrine, require foreign investors “to waive all rights to diplomatic protection”). 
 32. See, e.g., Israel-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 4, art. 3(1) (“Neither 
Contracting Party shall . . . subject . . . investors of the other Contracting Party to 
treatment less favorable than that which it accords to . . . its own investors . . . .”). 
 33. See BAKER, supra note 30, at 90 (claiming that, even though asserted by 
many Latin American nations, the Calvo Doctrine never became customary 
international law). 
 34. See Muchlinski, supra note 26, at 343 (emphasizing that this discretion is 
shaped by the political goals of the protecting state and, furthermore, that the 
protecting state was under no legal duty to hand over any reparations received to 
the claimant). 
 35. See Jeżewski, supra note 25, at 5 (describing how the evolution of “the 
international dispute settlement mechanism” led to international arbitration 
becoming the most appropriate forum to regulate and resolve investment claims). 
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To find a reasonable solution for developed and less developed 
nations alike, a World Bank study proposed the creation of an agency 
to facilitate resolution of international investment disputes.36 This 
proposal led to the drafting of the ICSID Convention.37 On October 
14, 1966, the Convention entered into force with the ratification of 
twenty countries, thus creating ICSID.38 As of April 10, 2006, 143 
countries are parties to the Convention.39  
B. PROCEDURAL CONDITIONS FOR JURISDICTION UNDER THE 
ICSID CONVENTION 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention confers jurisdiction upon the 
Centre to preside over investment disputes.40 It provides, in part:  
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal 
dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a 
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of 
a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) 
and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties 
to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.41 
Therefore, in order for the Centre to possess jurisdiction: (1) there 
must be a legal dispute; (2) the dispute must arise directly out of an 
underlying transaction; said transaction must (3) qualify as an 
investment and (4) be between a Contracting State and a national of 
another Contracting State (diverse); and (5) the parties must have 
consented to ICSID arbitration.42   
 
 36. See BAKER, supra note 30, at 42 (observing that the World Bank did not 
wish to be directly involved in mediating disputes). 
 37. See id. at 42-43 (asserting that advocates believed private international 
investment would increase with such an institution). 
 38. ICSID Rules, supra note 3, at intro. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See generally CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A 
COMMENTARY 82-344 (2001) (providing a comprehensive account of Article 25 
jurisprudence). 
 41. ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 25(1). 
 42. See id. (implying three procedural conditions must be met: a condition 
ratione materiae, a condition ratione personae, and a condition ratione voluntatis). 
Jurisdiction ratione temporis must also exist. See Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 54 (Apr. 15, 2009) (explaining the 
condition ratione temporis derives from a general principle of law, the principle of 
non-retroactivity, and requires that the Convention have been/be applicable at the 
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1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae) 
Subject-matter jurisdiction comprises the first three elements of 
Article 25(1) of the Convention.43 Because ICSID tribunals generally 
find the presence of the first two elements, their discussion will be 
more limited.44 The first element is meant to ensure the existence of a 
dispute that is both genuine and legal.45 The dispute must entail a 
conflict of rights; in other words, the dispute must concern either a 
legal obligation or reparation for breach of such an obligation.46 The 
second element, one of directness, requires that the dispute “be 
reasonably closely connected” to an investment.47 While ICSID 
jurisprudence has failed to delineate the difference between disputes 
arising directly and those arising merely indirectly, tribunals take 
into account “the general unity of an investment operation”48 and 
 
relevant time). 
 43. See generally Paolo Vargiu, Beyond Hallmarks and Formal Requirements: 
A “Jurisprudence Constante” on the Notion of Investment in the ICSID 
Convention, 10 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 753, 754 (2009) (highlighting the “typical 
characteristics” and “jurisdictional” approaches of interpretation of Article 25(1) in 
ICSID arbitration). 
 44. See, e.g., Československá Obchodní Banka, A.S. v. Slovakia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 61 (May 
24, 1999), reprinted in 14 ICSID REV.—FILJ 251 (1999) (suggesting that 
investment disputes are not deprived of their “legal character” in the presence of 
political elements or governmental actions); id. ¶ 72 (finding satisfaction of the 
“directness” requirement even in a claim arising out of an indirect dispute, so long 
as the indirect dispute is “an integral part of an overall operation that qualifies as 
an investment”). 
 45. See ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 25(1) (allowing jurisdiction over 
“any legal dispute”); SCHREUER, supra note 40, at 102 (asserting that, while “[t]he 
matter must have been taken up with the other party[,]” other remedies need not 
have been exhausted). 
 46. See Report on the Convention, supra note 9, at 28 (disallowing matters 
involving “mere conflicts of interests”); see also SCHREUER, supra note 40, at 105 
(noting legal disputes must invoke legal rights and seek legal remedies). 
 47. See SCHREUER, supra note 40, at 114 (adding that the directness 
requirement “is one of the objective criteria” and thus “independent of the parties’ 
consent”). Moreover, an investment need not be a “direct foreign investment.” See 
Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 24 (July 11, 1997), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1378 (1998) 
(stating that jurisdiction exists with respect to “indirect” investments “so long as 
the dispute arises directly from such transaction”). 
 48. See Fedax, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, ¶ 26 (quoting Holiday Inns v. 
Morocco, which found jurisdiction over loan contracts that had originated in 
agreements distinct from the investment (citation omitted)). 
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look for the existence of “distinctive features,” uncommon to all 
investment disputes, which link the dispute to the investment.49 
Because the ICSID Convention does not explicitly define the term 
“investment,” the third element of Article 25—qualification of the 
underlying transaction—has proven the most contentious.50 Tribunals 
have established a variety of investment qualification frameworks, 
construing the term “investment” both narrowly and broadly.51 In a 
landmark decision, Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Morocco52 set forth an 
objective test for investment qualification.53 The Salini tribunal 
suggeste: “The doctrine generally considers that investment infers: 
contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a 
participation in the risks of the transaction.”54 Most notably, though, 
it required that an investment contribute to the economic 
development of the host state.55  
 
 49. See SCHREUER, supra note 43, at 121 (“[T]he fact that transactions that are 
ancillary but vital to the investment are made in separate form and even through 
separate entities does not deprive a dispute relating to them of its direct 
character.”). 
 50. See Československá Obchodní Banka, A.S. v. Slovakia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 75 (May 24, 
1999), reprinted in 14 ICSID REV.—FILJ 251 (1999) (discussing whether outlays 
in development of banking infrastructure are “investments”); Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. 
Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 307 (July 24, 2008) (considering 
whether city water shares satisfy “investment”); Fedax, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/3, ¶ 18 (raising the issue of whether a loan constituted an “investment”). 
This tension was also evident in the drafting of the Convention. See SCHREUER, 
supra note 43, at 122-23 (highlighting the various proposals for and against 
limiting the definition of investment in the First Draft). 
 51. See, e.g., Fedax, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, ¶ 22 (stating that “loans, 
suppliers’ credits, outstanding payments, ownership of shares, and construction 
contracts” have all qualified as “investments”). 
 52. ICSID Case No. ARN/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 23, 2001), 
reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003). 
 53. See id. ¶ 52 (declaring that ICSID case law and legal authors suggest the 
investment requirement is an objective condition). But see Julian Davis Mortenson, 
The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International 
Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 257, 273 (2010) (“not[ing] that Schreurer has 
subsequently criticized . . . tribunals for badly overrading his discussion of Article 
25”). 
 54. Salini Construttori, ICSID Case No. ARN/00/4, ¶ 52 . 
 55. See id. (deducing an economic development factor from its reading of the 
ICSID Convention’s Preamble). 
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But since the ICSID Convention does not call for binding 
precedent, tribunals have used their discretion in applying and 
articulating the Salini test.56 Building upon Salini’s “objective” 
reading of Article 25(1), the Joy Mining Machinery, Ltd. v. Egypt57 
tribunal articulated its own jurisdictional criteria, most notably 
adding the requirement that an “investment” constitute “a significant 
contribution to the host State’s development.”58 Other tribunals have 
strictly applied the Salini test.59 The tribunal in Jan de Nul N.V. v. 
Egypt60 explicitly restated the Salini characteristics, only adding that 
they “may be closely interrelated, should be examined in their 
totality[,] and will normally depend on the circumstances of each 
case.”61 While some ICSID tribunals have broadened the scope of the 
Salini test by dropping the “contribution to economic development” 
requirement,62 others have dispensed with it altogether.63 In perhaps 
its most vehement repudiation to date, the tribunal in Biwater Gauff 
Ltd. v. Tanzania64 asserted that “there is no basis for a rote, or overly 
strict, application of the five Salini criteria in every case.”65 It 
concluded that, because the Convention did not provide “a strict, 
 
 56. See ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 53(1) (declaring awards to be 
binding only on the parties); SCHILL, supra note 6, at 291 (claiming the travaux 
preparatoires of the Convention show binding precedent was never intended). 
 57. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2004), 
reprinted in 19 ICSID REV.—FILJ 486 (2004). 
 58. See id. ¶¶ 50-53 (emphasis added) (stating that to do otherwise would 
render Article 25 a “meaningless provision”). 
 59. See, e.g., Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 55 (May 17, 2007) [hereinafter MHS 
Award] (treating the Salini elements as jurisdictional requirements). 
 60. ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 16, 2006). 
 61. See id. ¶ 91 (harmonizing with the rationale of Joy Mining Machinery, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11). 
 62. See, e.g., L.E.S.I.-Dipenta v. Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08, Award, 
§ 2, ¶ 13(iv) (Jan. 10, 2005) (asserting that consistency with the objective of the 
ICSID Convention demanded that an investment only fulfill the first three Salini 
criteria). 
 63. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment 
of the Argentine Republic, ¶¶ 71-72 (Sept. 25, 2007) (applying the BIT definition 
of “investment”). 
 64. ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award (July 24, 2008). 
 65. See id. ¶ 312 (reasoning that the Salini criteria “are not fixed or mandatory 
as a matter of law” nor appear in the ICSID Convention). 
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objective, [sic] definition of ‘investment,’” ICSID tribunals should 
not impose one.66  
2. Personal Jurisdiction (Jurisdiction Ratione  Personae) 
Personal jurisdiction, the fourth element, derives from the second 
clause of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention—the diversity 
requirement.67 It requires that the dispute be between a contracting 
state and an investor of another contracting state.68 For the purposes 
of Article 25(1), natural persons must have “the nationality of a 
Contracting State other than the State party.”69 Juridical persons, 
such as corporations or other business entities, must either have “the 
nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party” or be 
deemed foreign by contract.70 Natural persons must possess foreign 
nationality on two dates—the date on which both parties consent to 
submit the dispute to arbitration and the date on which the request is 
registered by ICSID—whereas juridical persons must only possess 
foreign nationality on one date—the date of consent.71 Still, the 
nationality of natural persons is rarely at issue.72 
 
 66. See id. ¶¶ 313, 316 (taking into account not only features identified in 
Salini but also the totality of the circumstances, including the BIT). 
 67. See generally Jan Schokkaert & Yvon Heckscher, Protected Investors 
Nationality, 10 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 699 (2009) (detailing the condition 
ratione personae). 
 68. See ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 25(1) (extending jurisdiction to 
disputes “between a Contracting State . . . and a national of another Contracting 
State”) (emphasis added). 
 69. See id. art. 25(2)(a) (preventing individuals possessing double nationality, 
of which one is the State party, from utilizing ICSID arbitration). 
 70. See id. art. 25(2)(a)-(b) (allowing locally incorporated or seated juridical 
persons access to ICSID “because of foreign control”). Under Additional Facility 
Rules, even non-Contracting States or their nationals may become parties to 
proceedings provided one party is a Contracting State or a national of a 
Contracting State. See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, art. 2, Apr. 10, 2006, 
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/AdditionalFacilityRules.jsp 
[hereinafter Additional Facility] (authorizing extrajurisdictional proceedings when 
one party is not a contracting state, a legal dispute does not arise directly out of an 
investment, or the purpose is fact-finding). 
 71. See ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 25(2)(a)-(b) (furnishing juridical 
persons with a more expansive notion of nationality). 
 72. Cf. Schokkaert & Heckscher, supra note 67, at 700 (emphasizing that the 
term “nationality” is infrequently used in “European conventional practice”). 
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In determining the nationality of a juridical person, two criteria are 
decisive: the place of incorporation and the place of the 
administrative seat, or siège social.73 But while either suffices to 
determine nationality for diplomatic protection, neither suffices to 
determine nationality for Article 25(2)(b).74 The purpose of Article 
25(1) is merely to designate the “outer limits” of ICSID’s 
jurisdiction.75 Thus, any stipulation of entity nationality in national 
legislation or in treaties, provides ICSID’s jurisdiction and, if based 
on reasonable criteria, will likely be honored.76   
3. The Consent Requirement (Jurisdiction Ratione  Voluntatis) 
The fifth and final jurisdictional element relates to consent.77 
Consent of the parties is the “cornerstone” of ICSID’s jurisdiction.78 
Parties must agree in writing to both the classes of disputes 
acceptable for arbitration and the use of ICSID as the forum.79 This 
endorsement is usually accomplished through BIT and FTA 
provisions.80 Once consent to jurisdiction has been given, it cannot 
be withdrawn unilaterally.81   
 
 73. See SCHREUER, supra note 40, at 277 (announcing that “the most widely 
used test” is the place of incorporation, but that alternatively the effective seat may 
be used). 
 74. See Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 
331, 360 (1972) (submitting that such a narrowly defined sense of nationality 
should be restricted to the context of diplomatic protection). 
 75. See id. at 360-61 (asserting that parties should have latitude to agree on the 
definition of nationality). 
 76. See Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 25-26 (Apr. 29, 2004), reprinted in 20 ICSID REV.—FILJ 205 
(2005) (ascribing weight to the scholarship of Broches and Schreuer for its broad 
construction of nationality). 
 77. See generally Stern, supra note 1, at 249-50 (explaining that consent can be 
found in ICSID arbitration clauses and agreements and through the combination of 
documents, such as national legislation and investor requests). 
 78. Report on the Convention, supra note 9, at 28. 
 79. See ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 25(4) (welcoming party-initiated 
limitations of jurisdiction at any time). 
 80. Compare Israel-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 4, art. 7(2) (entitling 
investors to ICSID arbitration in addition to domestic forums), with U.K.-Malaysia 
BIT, supra note 5, art. 7(1) (exemplifying parties which opt only for ICSID 
arbitration). 
 81. ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 25(1). 
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4. Testing for Jurisdiction 
While the ICSID Convention and trade agreements form the basis 
of ICSID’s jurisdiction, they must be interpreted in light of 
international law, namely, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (“Vienna Convention”).82 
a. The Vienna Convention 
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention states: “A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.”83 Within this framework, there are three 
approaches to investment treaty interpretation.84 The first approach is 
to focus on the “object and purpose” of the treaty by conducting a 
preamble-based interpretation.85 The second approach emphasizes 
“the wording of the text without special regard to the object and 
purpose of the treaty.”86 The final approach is to interpret in dubio 
mitius; that is, to narrowly construe limitations on the sovereignty of 
the states concerned.87 If such approaches of interpretation are 
unprofitable, courts may rely on supplementary means of analysis—
for example, the preparatory work of the treaty and the conditions of 
its completion—under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.88  
 
 82. See generally Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO 
Appellate Body Report in US—Gambling: A Critique, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 117 
(2006) (embracing a holistic approach to treaty interpretation under the Vienna 
Convention). 
 83. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (emphasis added). 
 84. See Rudolf Dolzer, The Notion of Investment in Recent Practice, in LAW IN 
THE SERVICE OF HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FLORENTINO FELICIANO 
261, 272 (Steve Charnovitz et al. eds., 2005) (proffering that, while Article 31 
might not yield “hard and fast results” as in other areas of international law, there 
are, however, three lines of reasoning that are “conceivable” in the context of 
investment treaties). 
 85. See id. at 272-73 (highlighting ICSID decisions in Tokios Tokelės v. 
Ukraine and SGS v. Philippines, which relied on the “object and purpose” of the 
treaties (citations omitted)). 
 86. See id. at 273-74 (citing the ICSID tribunals’ non-restrictive rulings in 
Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels v. Senegal and Amco Asia Corp. v. 
Indonesia (citations omitted)). 
 87. See id. at 274-75 (observing the ICSID tribunal’s analysis in SGS v. 
Pakistan (citation omitted)). 
 88. See Vienna Convention, supra note 83, art. 32 (allowing for supplementary 
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b. Bipartite Test for Jurisdiction  
ICSID tribunals have jurisdiction over disputes if: (1) the dispute 
arises out of an investment the ICSID Convention protects—that is, 
one covered by Article 25 of the Convention; and, if so, (2) the 
dispute involves an investment as defined by the BIT or FTA.89 BIT 
and FTA definitions may narrow but not expand the scope of 
jurisdiction granted by the first prong.90 Therefore, a BIT or an FTA 
alone cannot confer jurisdiction.91 
C. RECENT CHALLENGES TO THE TERM “INVESTMENT” 
Part I ends with a discussion of two recent judgments, Phoenix and 
MHS, that illustrate the underlying uncertainty in ICSID’s 
“investment” jurisprudence and sets up Part II’s analysis of what the 
term means under Article 25 of the Convention.92 First, Part I.C 
discusses the Phoenix tribunal’s reliance on objective criteria and 
supplementation to the Salini test.93 It then moves to the MHS 
committee’s explicit rejection of the Salini characteristics as 
jurisdictional requirements.94  
1. Phoenix 
Phoenix involved a dispute between Phoenix Action, Ltd. 
(“Phoenix”) and the Czech Republic over the treatment of its 
 
means when interpretation, according to Article 31, “leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure”). 
 89. See, e.g., Československá Obchodní Banka, A.S. v. Slovakia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 68 (May 
24, 1999), reprinted in 14 ICSID REV.—FILJ 251 (1999) (announcing that the 
parties’ agreement alone is inconclusive for resolving whether the dispute involves 
an investment protected by the Convention). 
 90. See Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 
308 (July 24, 2008) (explaining Tanzania’s stance that the scope of Article 25 
cannot be expanded by agreement because it has an autonomous meaning). 
 91. See Report on the Convention, supra note 9, at 28 (declaring that consent is 
a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for jurisdiction). 
 92. See Sean Kelsey, ARB. WORLD, May 2009, at 10, available at 
http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/detail.aspx?publication=5670#ICSID (last 
visited July 11, 2010) (opining that “[the two decisions] appear to have been 
reached in isolation from one another”). See generally Vargiu, supra note 43, at 
754 (surveying tribunals’ objective and subjective formulations of “investment”). 
 93. See discussion infra Part I.C.1. 
 94. See discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
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investments in Benet Praha (“BP”) and Benet Group (“BG”).95 BP 
and its subsidiary BG were Czech companies engaged in the trading 
of ferroalloys.96 Phoenix was a closely held Israeli corporation, 
having Vladimir Beno, a Czech national, as its sole shareholder.97  
In April 2001, Czech authorities began to investigate Beno, BP’s 
Executive Officer, amidst allegations of tax and customs duty 
evasion and income tax fraud.98 Pursuant to this criminal 
investigation, Czech police seized BP’s accounting and business 
records and froze its assets.99 Meanwhile, BG was embroiled in its 
own dispute, one over an acquisitions agreement it had executed on 
November 26, 2000.100 It was around this time that Beno fled to 
Israel and incorporated Phoenix.101  
On December 26, 2002, Phoenix became the sole owner of BP and 
BG.102 Phoenix claimed that, with regards to BG, it was denied 
justice because the lengthy civil litigation was still ongoing in Czech 
courts, and that the freezing of BP’s funds, the document seizure, and 
the tax and customs assessments were illegal.103 In response, the 
Czech Republic asserted that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction 
over the dispute because Phoenix was “an ex post facto creation of a 
sham Israeli entity.”104  
Building upon the articulation of Salini in Jan de Nul, the Phoenix 
tribunal held that six elements should be taken into account when 
determining if an investment is protected by ICSID:  
(1) a contribution in money or other assets; (2) a certain 
duration; (3) an element of risk; (4) an operation made in 
 
 95. Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 
Award, ¶¶ 2, 22 (Apr. 15, 2009). 
 96. Id. ¶ 25 (explaining that the businesses complemented each other: BP 
purchased ferroalloys internationally for sale on the Czech market and BG 
purchased and sold ferroalloy component materials internationally). 
 97. Id. ¶ 22. 
 98. Id. ¶ 32. 
 99. Id. ¶ 33. 
 100. Id. ¶ 30. 
 101. Id. ¶ 32. On October 14, 2001, Phoenix was incorporated in Israel; its 
permanent seat was in Tel Aviv. Id. ¶ 22. 
 102. Id. ¶ 22. At that time, both companies were already involved in legal 
disputes: BP with Czech fiscal authorities and BG with a private party. Id. ¶ 28. 
 103. Id. ¶ 44. 
 104. Id. ¶ 34. 
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order to develop an economic activity in the host State; (5) 
assets invested in accordance with the laws of the host State; 
and (6) assets invested bona fide.105  
Further refining its definition, the tribunal concluded that the BIT in 
no way narrowed the scope of investment.106 
This definition of investment contains two major modifications to 
the Salini test: the change of “contribution to economic 
development” to “development of economic activity”107 and the 
addition of a bona fide requirement.108 Four factors were critical to 
ascertaining the bona fide nature of the alleged investment: the 
timing of the investment, the timing of the claim, the substance of the 
transaction, and the true nature of the operation.109 “[T]iming of the 
investment” looks to whether damages were sustained before or after 
the investment was made.110 “[T]iming of the claim” assesses 
whether a good faith effort was made to resolve the dispute before its 
submission to ICSID.111 “[S]ubstance of the transaction” evaluates 
how the party conducted the transactions and whether there was a 
lack of transparency.112 Finally, the “true nature of the operation” 
factor seeks indicia of ulterior motives.113   
 
 105. See id. ¶¶ 114-15 (adding that “extensive scrutiny” is not always necessary 
and “they have to be analyzed with due consideration of all circumstances”). 
 106. See id. ¶ 116 (asserting that the BIT merely “expresses two necessary 
elements of the test”); see also Israel-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 4, art. 1(1) 
(stating “investments” shall be “any kind of assets”). 
 107. See Phoenix Action, Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, ¶ 85 (claiming 
contribution to development is “impossible to ascertain”). 
 108. See id. ¶¶ 135-44 (rationalizing that only bona fide investments deserve 
protection). 
 109. See id. ¶¶ 136, 138-40 (examining closely a whole host of factors). 
 110. See id. ¶ 137 (noting that Phoenix’s initial motive for bringing the claim 
was, admittedly, to bring the “pre-existing disputes” involving BG and BP before 
the ICSID tribunal). 
 111. See id. ¶ 138 (dismissing the idea that a two-month delay in solving an 
investment problem is a violation of fair and equitable treatment or full protection 
and security standards). 
 112. See id. ¶ 139 (alleging that the investment was a “mere redistribution of 
assets within the Beno family”). 
 113. See id. ¶ 140 (finding no economic activity where there is “[n]o business 
plan, no program of re-financing, no economic objectives . . . [and] no real 
valuation of the economic transactions”). 
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Based on the aforementioned factors, the Phoenix tribunal ruled on 
both jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione materiae.114 The 
tribunal, deeming place of incorporation and permanent seat as 
determinative, found that Phoenix had Israeli nationality, and the 
condition ratione personae was met.115 It did, however, find a 
jurisdictional issue in regard to the condition ratione materiae.116 The 
Phoenix tribunal saw through Phoenix’s ruse to bring its domestic 
dispute within ICSID’s purview; found the alleged investment did 
not develop a “national economic activity” but instead engaged in an 
“international legal activity”; and thus, held it lacked jurisdiction 
because the investment was not bona fide.117   
2. Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD (“MHS”) 
MHS involved a dispute between Malaysian Historical Salvors 
SDN BHD (“MHS”), a British corporation, and Malaysia over the 
proceeds of a salvage contract.118 On August 3, 1991, MHS entered 
into a contract entitling it to seventy percent of the proceeds if the 
auction value of the recovered items was less than $10 million.119 
Additionally, the Malaysian government reserved the right to 
withhold items from auction, provided it paid MHS their “best 
attainable value.”120 MHS’s efforts took nearly four years and 
resulted in the recovery of 24,000 items.121 The auctioned items 
fetched approximately $2.98 million.122 When MHS brought its claim 
 
 114. See id. ¶¶ 65-73 (the the prsence of jurisdiction ratione personae over 
Phoenix);  
id. ¶¶ 74-116 (concluding thatjurisdiction ratione materiae was lacking). 
 115. See id. ¶ 65 (noting the lack of discussion regarding Phoenix’s nationality). 
 116. See id. ¶ 142 (holding that the “investment” was not protected under the 
ICSID system because it was not a valid economic activity). 
 117. See id. ¶ 143 (employing the bona fide test against an “abusive distortion of 
the requirements for jurisdiction”). 
 118. MHS Award, supra note 59, ¶¶ 2-14. The contract called for the location 
and salvage of the cargo of the Diana vessel that sank off the coast of Malacca in 
1817. Id. ¶ 7. See generally Valentina Sara Vadi, Investing in Culture: Underwater 
Cultural Heritage and International Investment Law, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
853, 880 (2009) (claiming that the Diana was “laden with silks, tea, and blue-and-
white porcelain”). 
 119. MHS Award, supra note 59, ¶ 11. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. ¶ 13. 
 122. Id. 
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before ICSID, it alleged that it was paid only $1.2 million (or 40% of 
the amount realized from auction) and was owed an additional 
$400,000 for withheld items.123 Malaysia argued the tribunal did not 
have jurisdiction over the dispute because it did not concern an 
“investment.”124   
In contrast with the Phoenix tribunal’s jurisdictional analysis, the 
MHS annulment committee found the Salini criteria inconsistent with 
its approach to defining “investment.”125 Moreover, it restated the 
fact that the “criteria are not fixed or mandatory as a matter of 
law.”126 Under its analysis of Article 25(1), the committee interpreted  
the requirement that an investment contribute to economic 
development differently and thus afforded an expansive definition 
under the Convention.127  
The committee then turned to the U.K.-Malaysia BIT to see 
whether any other limitations needed to be imposed.128 Article 1(a) of 
the BIT prescribed the relevant definition: “‘[I]nvestment’ means 
every kind of asset . . . .”129 But for transactions carried on in 
Malaysia, Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of the BIT only protected investments 
made in projects “classified” by the Malaysian government.130 
Nonetheless, the committee found the salvage contract a kind of 
asset, related to an approved project, and thus constituted an 
investment.131 Because the contract qualified as an investment under 
both the ICSID Convention and the U.K.-Malaysia BIT, the sole 
 
 123. Id. ¶ 14. 
 124. Id. ¶ 41.1. 
 125. See MHS Annulment, supra note 11, ¶ 78 (respecting the authors of Salini, 
but declaring its approach “consonant with the intentions of the Parties to the 
ICSID Convention”). 
 126. See id. ¶¶ 77-79 (quoting Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania (citation omitted)) 
(criticizing the sole arbitrator for acting contrary to academic commentary and 
previous arbitral decisions and treating these characteristics as jurisdictional 
requirements). 
 127. Id. ¶¶ 75, 80. 
 128. See id. ¶¶ 58-62 (discovering “the intentions and specifications of the 
States” by analyzing the BIT). 
 129. See id. ¶ 59 (finding the BIT “defines ‘investment’ capaciously”); see also 
U.K.-Malaysia BIT, supra note 5, art. 1(a) (detailing the scope of protected assets). 
 130. U.K.-Malaysia BIT, supra note 5, art. 1(1)(b)(ii). 
 131. See MHS Annulment, supra note 11, ¶¶ 60-61, 80 (advancing that “there is 
no room for another conclusion”). 
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arbitrator’s Award on Jurisdiction constituted a manifest excess of 
power.132  
II. ANALYSIS 
The ICSID Convention was enacted to generate “international 
cooperation for economic development.”133 This goal led to the 
creation of an arbitration system charged with a poorly defined 
mandate, which has proven problematic.134 Without a clear sense of 
purpose, the ICSID system frequently is forced to weigh the lofty 
goals for which it was created against the fundamental principle of 
consent found throughout the Convention.135 The Phoenix and MHS 
rulings provide an acute illustration of tribunals’ vacillation between 
two modes of analysis: an objective standard of “investment” to 
ensure the ICSID fulfills its unique role and a subjective standard 
which gives due deference to the expressed intent of freely 
contracting parties.136 For that reason, Part II analyzes the rationale of 
both tribunals in their respective rulings on jurisdiction and explores 
where jurisdiction should ultimately lie. Part II.A discusses whether 
the tribunals properly determined their jurisdiction under Article 25 
 
 132. See id. ¶ 80 (detailing the manifest excesses of power to be: not applying 
the BIT definition, treating the Salini criteria as “jurisdictional conditions,” and 
reaching conclusions “not consonant with the travaux”). 
 133. See ICSID Convention, supra note 2, pmbl. (stating that this purpose is 
accomplished by protecting “private international investment”). 
 134. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1568-74, 1582 (2005) (concluding the SGS v. Pakistan 
and SGS v. Philippines awards demonstrate that “new waves of inconsistent 
decisions are alive and well” (citations omitted)). 
 135. See Broches, supra note 74, at 362 (seeing the drafters’ failure “to devise a 
generally acceptable definition of the term ‘investment’” as yielding to “the 
essential requirement of consent by the Parties”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 136. Compare Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 140 (Apr. 15, 2009) (withholding jurisdiction ratione 
materiae because of a lack of purposeful national economic activity), with MHS 
Annulment, supra note 11, ¶¶ 60-61 (annulling the Award on Jurisdiction based on 
the parties’ agreed-to definition of “investment”). See generally Mary E. Hiscock, 
The Emerging Legal Concept of Investment, 27 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 765 
(2009) (analyzing thoroughly the competing legal norms in ICSID’s “investment” 
jurisprudence). 
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of the ICSID Convention and the relevant BITs.137 Part II.B argues 
that, in order to achieve the Centre’s mandate, ICSID tribunals 
should construe their jurisdiction as broadly as the Convention and 
relevant member states’ BITs and FTAs allow.138  
A. THE ICSID CONVENTION AND THE RELEVANT MEMBER 
STATES’ AGREEMENTS EMPOWER ICSID TO EXERCISE 
JURISDICTION OVER A BROAD RANGE OF “INVESTMENTS” 
PROVIDED ALL OTHER PROCEDURAL CONDITIONS ARE MET   
Before an ICSID tribunal may exercise jurisdiction over a claim, a 
legal dispute pitting a Contracting State against a national of another 
Contracting State must have arisen out of an investment, and these 
parties must have expressly consented to ICSID’s arbitration of the 
dispute.139 Once these events have occurred, the tribunal is tasked 
with determining its own competence, or jurisdiction, over the 
dispute.140 In order for the tribunal to exercise jurisdiction, the 
dispute must have arisen out of a protected investment—that is, one 
recognized by both the Convention and the relevant BIT or FTA.141  
In Phoenix, the tribunal declined jurisdiction under Article 25(1) 
because the investment was not bona fide and therefore did not 
satisfy the condition ratione materiae.142 It feared protection of such 
investments would make “the jurisdiction of BIT and ICSID 
tribunals . . . virtually unlimited.”143 On the other hand, the 
 
 137. See discussion infra Part II.A (concluding that the Phoenix tribunal 
improperly withheld jurisdiction ratione materiae and the MHS committee validly 
annulled the earlier award). 
 138. See discussion infra Part II.B (concluding that the “outer limits” of 
jurisdiction should be derived from the consent of the parties). 
 139. See ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 25(1) (establishing that these 
three procedural conditions act as triggering conditions). 
 140. See id. art. 41 (empowering ICSID tribunals to determine jurisdiction “as a 
preliminary question or to join it to the merits of the dispute”). 
 141. See discussion supra Part I.B.4.b (explaining the tribunal’s bipartite test 
for jurisdiction in Československá Obchodní Banka, A.S. v. Slovakia 
(citation omitted)). 
 142. See Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 
Award, ¶¶ 145-46 (Apr. 15, 2009) (stating that this conclusion was derived from 
the object and purpose of both the Convention and the Israel-Czech Republic BIT). 
 143. See id. ¶ 144 (speculating that extending jurisdiction “would go against the 
basic objectives underlying the ICSID Convention” and thus would be an 
impermissible expansion of Article 25). 
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annulment committee in MHS stipulated no such requirement, ruling 
that the BIT’s lack of conflict with Article 25(1) of the Convention 
allowed it to assign “investment” the definition contained in the 
BIT.144 Thus, in defining “investment” for the arbitration of a 
dispute, ICSID tribunal must ensure that their definition neither 
impermissibly expands the scope of Article 25 by adding 
inconsistent definitions from the BIT or FTA, nor restricts the scope 
of the relevant BIT or FTA by imposing definitions not envisaged by 
the drafters of the Convention.145 
1. Protected Investments Need Not Have a Readily Ascertainable 
“Contribution to Economic Development” nor Be Bona Fide 
As discussed in the previous section on Article 25 jurisdiction, the 
condition ratione materiae requires the underlying transaction 
qualify as an “investment.”146 Because both the MHS and Phoenix 
tribunals’ jurisdictional analyses centered on this element,147 the 
forthcoming analysis will treat the other elements of the condition 
ratione materiae as met. Moreover, since the Phoenix tribunal found 
that Phoenix Action’s investments satisfied the first five elements of 
its expanded Salini test,148 the analysis of its failure to exercise 
jurisdiction ratione materiae will only examine whether an 
investment must be bona fide to qualify for protection.149 The 
 
 144. See MHS Annulment, supra note 11 ¶ 80 (holding that the previous 
tribunal’s failure to apply the U.K.-Malaysia BIT constituted a manifest excess of 
power). 
 145. See, e.g., Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 
Award, ¶ 312 (July 24, 2008) (juggling the travaux preparatoires and the BIT to 
define “investment”). 
 146. See discussion supra Part I.B (requiring also that (1) there be a legal 
dispute; and (2) the dispute arise directly out of an underlying transaction). 
 147. See MHS Annulment, supra note 11, ¶ 80 (annulling decision based on an 
improper definition of “investment”); Phoenix Action, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 
¶ 74 (postulating that “fail[ure] to satisfy the criterion of an ‘investment’ within the 
meaning of Article 25” would preclude its exercise of jurisdiction and foregoing 
analysis of the other two elements) (internal citation omitted). 
 148. See Phoenix Action, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, ¶¶ 118-34 (holding the 
acquisition of these local corporations—the investment—included a contribution in 
money, had a certain duration, contained an element of risk, developed an 
economic activity in the host state, and was made in accordance with Czech law). 
 149. It follows that if a bona fide requirement was incorrectly applied, under the 
Phoenix tribunal’s own analysis, then it had jurisdiction ratione materiae. 
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following analyses use two approaches: preamble-based 
interpretation and text-based interpretation.150 
a.  No Preamble Imposes a “Contribution to Economic 
Development” or a Bona Fide Requirement on “Investment” 
Preamble-based interpretation seeks to define “investment” by 
ascertaining its meaning from the relevant treaty’s preamble.151 The 
“object and purpose” of the ICSID Convention is to promote 
economic development through international cooperation.152 Its 
Preamble stresses the role private international investment plays in 
development, and thus, it underscores that the Convention is meant 
to create a climate favorable for such investment.153 The preambles 
of the Israel-Czech Republic BIT and the U.K.-Malaysia BIT take a 
similar tone: their “object and purpose” is to stimulate investment to 
the benefit of both parties.154 Additionally, they recognize that 
 
 150. See Dolzer, supra note 84, at 274-75 (observing a third approach: 
interpretation in dubio mitius). The principle in dubio mitius (in doubt less) 
requires that ambiguous terms be resolved in favor of the one that is less onerous, 
less interferential with territorial and personal supremacy, or less restrictive. See 
Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R; WT/DS48/AB/R, n.154 (Jan. 16, 1998) 
(summarizing this principle as giving “deference to the sovereignty of states”); see 
also SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction,  
¶¶ 171-72 (Aug. 6, 2003), reprinted in 18 ICSID REV.—FILJ 307 (2003) (using 
this principle to rule that a state must respect its undertakings with foreign 
investors). 
 151. See, e.g., Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 27-52 (Apr. 29, 2004), reprinted in 20 ICSID REV.—
FILJ 205 (2005) (defining “investor” using a preamble-based interpretation of the 
Convention and the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT). But this approach can prove 
problematic. See Mortenson, supra note 53, at 311 (claiming that an objective 
investment standard, which was constructed under the guise of “object and 
purpose,” actually “vitiates precisely the bargain which ICSID was designed to 
enable”). 
 152. SCHREUER, supra note 40, at 4 (interpreting the first line of the Preamble to 
be its purpose). 
 153. See ICSID Convention, supra note 2, pmbl. (“[c]onsidering the need for 
international cooperation for economic development, and the role of private 
international investment [has] therein”); SCHREUER, supra note 40, at 4 (stating 
that “[e]conomic development depends in large measure on private international 
investment”). 
 154. See Israel-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 4, pmbl. (aiming for the 
“intensif[ication] of economic cooperation” between the two countries); U.K.-
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“increas[ed] prosperity in both States” will only occur through the 
“reciprocal promotion and protection of investments.”155 While these 
“object and purpose” statements are very broad, should there be any 
doubt if an investment is entitled to protection, the term “investment” 
must be construed in favor of investment protection and in favor of 
ICSID jurisdiction.156 
i. Neither BIT’s Preamble nor the ICSID  Preamble Imposes a 
“Development” Requirement 
In light of the Preamble of the ICSID Convention and the 
preambles of the respective BITs, both the Phoenix tribunal and the 
MHS committee properly took an expansive view of Salini’s 
“contribution to economic development” criterion.157 Under the 
bipartite test, the term “investment” must be defined first with regard 
to the “object and purpose” of the ICSID Convention.158 The 
promotion of economic development through international 
cooperation cannot be read, in an ordinary sense, to require a 
measurable “contribution to economic development.”159 Economic 
development is a nebulous concept, one that is not readily 
 
Malaysia BIT, supra note 5, pmbl. (asserting “favourable conditions for greater 
investment” will bring about this goal). 
 155. U.K.-Malaysia BIT, supra note 5, pmbl.; see also Israel-Czech Republic 
BIT, supra note 4, pmbl. (hypothesizing that this “will . . . stimulat[e] . . . 
individual business initiative”). 
 156. See, e.g., Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/94/2, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (Dec. 24, 1996), 14 ICSID REV.—FILJ 161, 194 (1999) 
(suggesting that if there is doubt regarding the meaning of a relevant Albanian law, 
the law should be interpreted “in favour of investor protection and in favour of 
ICSID jurisdiction in particular”). 
 157. Cf. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 116, 118 (Jan. 29, 2004) 
(resolving uncertainties in their “object and purpose” analysis of the Swiss-
Pakistan BIT in favor of investment protection and stating limitations “could 
readily have been expressed”). 
 158. See Československá Obchodní Banka, A.S. v. Slovakia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 57, 68 (May 
24, 1999), reprinted in 14 ICSID REV.—FILJ 251 (1999) (dictating “investment” 
be defined first under the Convention). 
 159. But see Mitchell v. Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the 
Application for Annulment of the Award, ¶ 33 (Nov. 1, 2006) (holding that, while 
a contribution to economic development is a necessary criterion of investment, it 
need not “always be sizable or successful”). 
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quantifiable and, moreover, is subject to divergent viewpoints.160 The 
MHS committee, recognizing it was not “fixed or mandatory as a 
matter of law,” wisely dispensed with the “contribution to economic 
development” criterion.161   
Furthermore, given the unhelpful nature of an even broader 
criterion, “development of economic activity” presents an 
unworkable solution and should not be used as a criterion for 
“investment” under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.162 An 
investment that meets the elements of contribution, duration, and risk 
inherently develops an “economic activity.”163 Additionally, the 
Phoenix tribunal’s dilution of the fourth Salini criterion to a 
redundancy can serve only to further fracture “investment” 
jurisprudence and has little analytical merit.164 No “development” 
requirement can be derived from a preambular analysis of the ICSID 
Convention.165 
The appropriate inclusion or exclusion of a “development” 
requirement of investment turns on whether it can be read from 
either BIT.166 The Israel-Czech Republic BIT and the U.K.-Malaysia 
 
 160. See Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 
Award, ¶ 85 (Apr. 15, 2009) (highlighting the problematic nature of this Salini 
factor). It continued: “A less ambitious approach should therefore be adopted, 
centered on the contribution of an international investment to the economy of the 
host State . . . .” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Sedelmayer v. Russian Federation for 
the proposition that investments are “made within the frame of a commercial 
activity” and “aim[ed] at creating a further economic value” (citation omitted)). 
 161. MHS Annulment, supra note 11, ¶¶ 78-79 (embracing the absence of a 
formal definition of “investment” from the Convention). 
 162. See, e.g., L.E.S.I.-Dipenta v. Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08, Award, 
§ II, ¶ 13(iv) (Jan. 10, 2005) (pronouncing that contribution to the host State’s 
development is “difficult to ascertain” and “implicitly covered by the other three 
[Salini] criteria”). 
 163. See Phoenix Action, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, ¶ 85 (rendering its 
expansion of “contribution to economic development” to “development of 
economic activity” a nullity by its own analysis). 
 164. But see SCHREUER, supra note 40, at 125 (allowing the argument “that 
there should be some positive impact on development”). 
 165. See id. at 140 (noting that, while the “wording of the Preamble and the 
Executive Directors’ Report . . . suggest that development is part of the 
Convention’s object and purpose[,] [t]h[is] feature[] should not necessarily be 
understood as [a] jurisdictional requirement[]”). 
 166. See Československá Obchodní Banka, A.S. v. Slovakia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/4, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 57, 68 (May 24, 1999), 
reprinted in 14 ICSID REV.—FILJ 251 (1999)  (necessitating the second step: BIT 
1056 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:1031 
BIT each propose that they are meant to stimulate investment to the 
benefit of both countries.167 Such “object and purpose” statements are 
more expansive than the “development” requirement.168 Thus, since 
they do not act as a limitation on the scope of the Convention, such 
preambles do not affect the definition of “investment” under Article 
25.169   
ii. Neither the Preamble of the ICSID Convention nor the Preamble 
of the Israel–Czech Republic BIT Institutes a  Bona Fide Requirement 
on “Investment” 
According to the Phoenix tribunal, the “object and purpose” of 
both the BIT and the Convention compel that an investment be bona 
fide.170 Considering “the need for international cooperation for 
economic development”171 and the creation of “favorable conditions 
for [greater] investment[],”172 the principle of effectiveness 
establishes that a bona fide requirement should be included only if it 
is “the interpretation that would most effectively fulfil the objectives 
of . . . [the] treaty.”173 The Israel–Czech Republic BIT states an 
investment is “any kind of asset[] invested in connection with 
economic activities . . . in the territory of the other Contracting Party 
 
analysis). 
 167. Israel-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 4, pmbl.; U.K.-Malaysia BIT, supra 
note 5, pmbl. 
 168. Economic development tends to embody a holistic notion of wealth, 
whereas prosperity is usually equated with financial wealth. See generally Ha-Joon 
Chang, Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: How Development Has 
Disappeared from Today’s “Development” Discourse, in TOWARDS NEW 
DEVELOPMENTALISM: MARKET AS MEANS RATHER THAN MASTER (S. Khan & J. 
Christiansen eds., forthcoming 2010) (arguing for a “new developmentalism” that 
revives the “productionist” concern of old development economics and pays 
greater attention to issues of human development). 
 169. See Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 
308 (July 24, 2008) (discussing the scope of jurisdiction). 
 170. See Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 
Award, ¶ 106 (Apr. 15, 2009) (offering access to ICSID arbitration only to 
investments made in good faith). 
 171. ICSID Convention, supra note 2, pmbl. 
 172. Israel-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 4, art. 2(1) 
 173. See Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals—An 
Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301, 317 (2008) (arguing that a preamble 
should not be “interpreted in a way that makes other provisions superfluous or 
meaningless”). 
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in accordance with [its] laws and regulations . . . .”174 Under the 
good faith principle, a bona fide investment is any kind of asset 
invested with the intent to develop an economic activity in 
accordance with the other state’s laws and regulations.175 Any 
investment meeting the typical characteristics of investment 
implicitly develops an economic activity.176 Further, construing the 
reciprocal protection of investments less restrictively on the host 
state, the minimum body of legal rights it objectively intended to 
provide is that accorded by its laws and regulations.177 Because the 
bona fide element is a superfluous criterion for investment, it should 
not be required.178  
b. No Text Imposes a “Contribution to  Economic Development” or a 
Bona Fide Requirement on “Investment” 
The ICSID Convention “is not to be construed restrictively, nor, as 
a matter of fact, broadly or liberally.”179 Rather, “[i]t is to be 
construed in a way which leads to find[ing] out and [] respect[ing] 
the common will of the parties” and “in good faith, . . . by taking into 
account the consequences of the[] commitments the parties may . . . 
hav[e] reasonably and legitimately envisaged.”180 To ascertain what 
 
 174. Israel-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 4, art. 1(1) (emphasis added). 
 175. See Phoenix Action, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, ¶¶ 135-44 (holding 
protection turned on Phoenix’s motives in making the investment). 
 176. See id. ¶ 85 (asserting that normally “national economic activity” is 
inherent in the mere presence of contribution, duration, and risk). 
 177. But cf. Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 31 (Apr. 29, 2004), reprinted in 20 ICSID REV.—FILJ 205 
(2005) (finding a similarly worded BIT preamble “should not be used to restrict 
the scope of ‘investors’” in favor of the Ukraine). 
 178. See Phoenix Action, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, ¶ 142 (conflating 
jurisdiction ratione materiae with jurisdiction ratione temporis in its assessment 
that the “pre-existing domestic dispute” did not make the transaction bona fide). 
 179. Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 14(i) (Sept. 25, 1983), reprinted in 1 ICSID Rep. 377 (1993). 
 180. See id. (opining that “such a method of interpretation is but the application 
of the fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda”); see also Société Ouest 
Africaine des Bétons Industriels v. Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/82/1, Award, ¶ 
4(10) (Feb. 25, 1988), reprinted in 2 ICSID Rep. 190 (1993) (“It is this principle of 
interpretation [the principle of good faith], rather than one of a priori strict, or, for 
that matter, broad and liberal construction, that the Tribunal has chosen to apply.”). 
See generally Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to 
Foreign Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 
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the parties reasonably contemplated, it is instructive to look at the 
language of the BITs. The Israel–Czech Republic BIT conceives of 
“investment” as “any kind of asset[],” and it expressly considers the 
shareholders’ rights.181 The U.K.-Malaysia BIT envisages 
“investment” as “every kind of asset,”182 but limits investments U.K. 
nationals make to those which the Malaysian government has 
approved.183   
i. No Relevant Treaty Article Imposes a “Development” Requirement 
Under the ICSID Convention, the “contribution to economic 
development” requirement is a preambular notion of “investment” 
not contained in Article 25 and thus inapposite to the following 
analysis.184 To ascertain the common will of the parties, it is 
necessary to determine whether a “contribution to economic 
development” can be read from the U.K.-Malaysia BIT or a 
“development of economic activity” requirement can be gleaned 
from the Israel–Czech Republic BIT.185 The Israel–Czech Republic 
BIT explicitly requires that assets be “invested in connection with 
economic activities.”186 But, as the Phoenix tribunal made clear, such 
a connection is inherent in the other Salini criteria.187 The U.K.-
 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1605 (2009) (warning that, while BITs reaffirm pacta 
sunt servanda explicitly through “umbrella” clauses and indirectly through 
“adequate” compensation and “fair and equitable treatment” clauses, they can 
“complicate pacta sunt servanda principles by interfering with or overriding 
contract-based dispute settlement procedures”). 
 181. See Israel-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 4, art. 1(1)(b) (emphasis added) 
(recognizing “rights derived from shares, bonds and other kinds of interest in 
companies”). 
 182. U.K.-Malaysia BIT, supra note 5, art. 1(a) (emphasis added). 
 183. See id. art. 1(b)(ii) (“[Approved projects must be] classified by the 
appropriate Ministry of Malaysia in accordance with its legislation and 
administrative practice . . . .”). 
 184. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.a.i (concluding that no applicable 
preamble imposes a “development” requirement on investment). 
 185. See Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 14(ii) (Sept. 25, 1983), reprinted in 1 ICSID Rep. 377 (1993) 
(analyzing the language of the parties’ contract and the Application to Establish PT 
Amco Indonesia to determine their will). 
 186. Israel–Czech Republic BIT, supra note 4, art. 1(1) (emphasis added). 
 187. Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 
Award, ¶¶ 84-85 (Apr. 15, 2009); cf. Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 320 (July 24, 2008) (suggesting that any investment 
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Malaysia BIT mentions no such requirement.188 As a result, under a 
text-based approach, the MHS committee properly annulled an award 
that elevated the “contribution to economic development” to a 
jurisdictional condition.189 Based on the foregoing analysis, a text-
based interpretation would not impose a “development” requirement 
in either case.   
ii. Neither Article 25 of the Convention nor Article 1 of the Israel–
Czech Republic BIT Institutes a Bona Fide Requirement on 
“Investment” 
In analyzing contracts, the principle of good faith requires there be 
no deceit or artifice during the negotiation and execution of the 
investment instruments, nor any intention of nonperformance.190 A 
failure to exercise one’s rights honestly and loyally constitutes an 
abuse of rights and violates this principle.191 Based on its BIT with 
Israel, the Czech Republic only contemplated having to protect 
investments made in accordance with its laws and regulations.192 But 
Phoenix did not misrepresent any of its actions, completed all of its 
obligations, and made all of its investments in accordance with 
Czech law.193 Consequently, the bona fide requirement was a 
construct meant to circumvent the real jurisdictional issue at hand: 
 
would constitute an economic activity). 
 188. See U.K.-Malaysia BIT, supra note 5, art. 1 (lacking any reference to 
development of any kind). 
 189. See Biwater Gauff, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, ¶ 312 (intimating that a 
“contribution to economic development” requirement should be excluded when it 
is absent from the BIT). 
 190. See Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, 
Award, ¶¶ 231-36 (Aug. 2, 2006) (applying the principle of good faith to redress 
fraudulent acts and false information). 
 191. See Robert D. Sloane, Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary 
International Legal Regulation of Nationality, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 19 (2009) 
(claiming that the status and utility of the principle of abuse of rights is 
controversial). 
 192. See Israel-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 4, art. 1(1) (requiring that 
“investments” be made “in accordance with [its] laws and regulations”). 
 193. Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 
Award, ¶ 134 (Apr. 15, 2009). More importantly, it found that even the principle of 
good faith in Czech law was not violated. See id. (contending that the investment 
was not made “with dissimulation or otherwise contestable methods”). 
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the absence of jurisdiction ratione personae. Therefore, it should not 
be a criterion for the term “investment.”194  
2. The Phoenix Tribunal Was Empowered to Dismiss on Two Other 
Grounds 
a. The Phoenix Tribunal Could Have “Pierced the Corporate Veil” 
and Found No  Jurisdiction Ratione Personae 
An ICSID tribunal may exercise its authority to arbitrate only over 
disputes for which it has jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione 
personae.195 While Phoenix represents an egregious abuse of the 
ICSID system by the claimant, a natural and ordinary reading of 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and the Israel–Czech Republic 
BIT would have granted jurisdiction ratione materiae over the 
dispute.196 But using the equitable principle of “veil piercing,” the 
Phoenix tribunal could have found insufficient diversity for 
jurisdiction ratione personae and achieved the same desired and just 
outcome.197   
In reaching its award, the Phoenix tribunal failed to spot the real 
issue at hand: the lack of mixed parties. The corporation was merely 
an “alter ego” of the claimant, a Czech national, registered solely to 
gain access to ICSID arbitration in an outrageous display of treaty 
shopping.198 The equitable principle of “veil piercing” allows for 
removal of the legal fiction of corporate identity in cases of basic 
 
 194. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (arguing that the real issue was the 
claimant’s nationality). 
 195. See Phoenix Action, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, ¶ 54 (deriving the 
conditions ratione materiae and ratione personae from Article 25 of the 
Convention). Of course, jurisdiction ratione temporis and ratione voluntatis must 
also exist. See id. (deriving the condition ratione temporis from general principles 
of international law). 
 196. See discussion supra Parts III.A.1.a.ii, III.A.1.b.ii (concluding that the bona 
fide requirement is an impermissible restriction on “investment”); see also Phoenix 
Action, Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, ¶¶ 22, 32-34 (pointing out that Phoenix 
was a sham entity incorporated by a Czech national). 
 197. See Phoenix Action, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, ¶ 144 (refusing 
jurisdiction to prevent “an abusive manipulation of the system of international 
investment protection under the ICSID Convention and the BITs”). 
 198. The Czech Republic raised this issue, but the Phoenix tribunal chose not to 
address it. See id. ¶ 146 (finding “no protected investment,” and thus, electing not 
to address the Czech government’s other objections). 
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injustice or fundamental unfairness.199 In municipal law, the 
corporate veil has been lifted to prevent misuse of legal personality, 
to protect third persons, and to prevent evasion of legal requirements 
or obligations.200 The tribunal’s reluctance to employ “veil piercing” 
is likely attributable to the International Court of Justice’s holding in 
Barcelona Traction201 that, in the scheme of diplomatic protection, 
the doctrine is inappropriate.202 But BITs and the ICSID Convention 
preclude recourse to diplomatic protection and, furthermore, contain 
their own definitions of corporate nationality, making diplomatic 
protection principles inapposite.203   
Contrary to the holding in Barcelona Traction and unlike the 
situation in Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine,204 piercing the corporate veil 
was required.205 The Phoenix tribunal found Phoenix’s actions were 
 
 199. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 52-71 (2d ed., 
2009) (surveying “veil piercing” and other related doctrines). Admittedly, courts 
have shown themselves far more willing to pierce the corporate veil in tort cases 
than in contract cases. See id. at 56-58 (submitting that the nature of the claim and 
the nature of the defendant are critical factors in any “veil piercing” case). 
 200. See Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 54 (Apr. 29, 2004), reprinted in 20 ICSID REV.—FILJ 205 (2005) 
(suggesting that “veil piercing” is especially appropriate in cases of fraud or 
malfeasance and to protect creditors or purchasers) (citation omitted). 
 201. Barcelona Traction, Lights and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 
42 (Feb. 5) (ruling that a corporation is a national of the state in which it is 
incorporated for purposes of diplomatic protection). 
 202. See id. (stating, for corporations, no test of “genuine connection” has found 
widespread acceptance). 
 203. See Broches, supra note 74, at 360-61 (maintaining that Barcelona 
Traction “is without relevance to the meaning of the term ‘nationality’ in Article 
25(2)(b)” of the Convention and advancing that a broader approach would “give 
effect to economic realities such as ownership and control”). See generally 
Lawrence J. Lee, Barcelona Traction in the 21st Century: Revisiting Its Customary 
and Policy Underpinnings 35 Years Later, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 237, 270 (2006) 
(detailing the use of the equitable principle of “veil piercing” in modern 
international law). 
 204. See ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, ¶¶ 1-4 (involving a Ukrainian-controlled 
corporation based in Lithuania that had substantial and long-standing business ties 
to its corporate seat). See generally Andriy Alexeyev & Sergiy Voitovich, Tokios 
Tokelės Vector: Jurisdictional Issues in ICSID Case Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, 9 
J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 519, 520 (2008) (presenting the conceptual issues 
surrounding jurisdiction ratione personae). 
 205. See Tokios Tokelės, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, ¶ 56 (refusing to “pierce 
the veil” because the claimant did not create his corporation “for the purpose of 
gaining access to ICSID arbitration under the BIT against the Ukraine”). 
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meant to “bring . . . pre-existing disputes involving Benet Group and 
Benet Praha before th[e] Tribunal,” and thus, it can reasonably be 
inferred that this was also the motivation for the incorporation of 
Phoenix Action, Ltd. in Israel.206 Differentiating Phoenix from 
Tokios Tokelės, the claimant created his corporation “for the purpose 
of gaining access to ICSID arbitration under the BIT” against the 
Czech Republic.207 The tribunal should have concluded that the 
corporation was a natural person of Czech nationality, and thus it did 
not have jurisdiction ratione personae.208 
b. Alternatively, It Could Have Dismissed the Claim as an Abuse of 
Process 
While the ICSID Convention does not explicitly confer the power 
to dismiss a claim on grounds of abuse of process, “if such a power 
exists, it would only be for the purpose of protecting the integrity of 
the Tribunal’s process or dealing with genuinely vexatious 
claims.”209 Nonetheless, “[i]t is almost tautological to say a tribunal 
 
 206. See Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 
Award, ¶ 137 (Apr. 15, 2009) (underscoring Beno’s flight from criminal 
prosecution). Additionally, Phoenix notified the Czech Republic of an investment 
dispute before it had even registered its purchases. See id. ¶ 138 (questioning 
further Phoenix’s claims of injustice under fair and equitable treatment given it had 
only allowed the government two months to resolve the issues). 
 207. See Tokios Tokelės, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, ¶ 56 (accepting that 
Tokios Tokelės was not established for the purpose of gaining access to ICSID 
arbitration as it had been established six years before the BIT came into effect); see 
also Phoenix Action, Ltd., ARB/06/5, ¶ 35(d) (highlighting the Czech Republic’s 
argument that “[t]he Benet Companies, rather than Phoenix, [we]re the real parties 
in interest, and the diversity of nationality requirement and the exclusive remedies 
principle[s] [we]re therefore not satisfied”). 
 208. See Phoenix Action, Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, ¶ 40 (“Phoenix’s 
claims should still be dismissed because the presentation of an ICSID claim under 
the circumstances is abusive . . . . Where there is . . . an abuse of a corporate 
structure, the Tribunal should look beyond the apparent facts and lift the corporate 
veil.”); see also Tokios Tokelės, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, ¶ 56 (allowing “veil 
piercing” for abuses of corporate personality). 
 209. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3, Mexico’s Preliminary Objection Concerning the Previous 
Proceedings, ¶ 49 (June 26, 2002) (contrasting the Convention with the explicit 
power provided in Article 294(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea); see also Libananco Holdings Co. v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, 
Decision on Preliminary Issues, ¶ 78 (June 23, 2008) (adding that this inherent 
power exists “even if the remedies open to [ICSID tribunals] are necessarily 
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has the power to dismiss an application which is an abuse of its 
process.”210 Although jurisdiction technically exists, the tribunal may 
dismiss a claim pursuant to procedural or substantive defects.211 Both 
claims based on fraud and illegality, as well as those brought in bad 
faith, provide occasion for a tribunal to disqualify or terminate 
proceedings.212 
The Phoenix tribunal found “that the initiation and pursuit of th[e] 
[claim] [wa]s an abuse of the international investment protection 
regime under the BIT and, consequently, of the ICSID 
Convention.”213 In the absence of an investment made contrary to the 
laws of the Czech Republic and thus the BIT, dismissal for an abuse 
of process would have been more appropriate.214 In fact, such a 
decision would have accorded with the tribunal’s award of all costs 
to the Czech Republic.215   
 
different from those that might be available to . . . domestic court[s] of law”). 
 210. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2008 I.C.J. 
Pleadings 15, ¶¶ 15, 19-20 (June 19, 2008) (finding two bases for this power: the 
court’s overall responsibility to safeguard the integrity of its procedure and “the 
general duty of loyalty between the parties”). 
 211. See Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
Award, ¶¶ 141-43 (Aug. 27, 2008) (reasoning that granting the protections 
provided by the Energy Charter Treaty would run contrary to the principle nemo 
auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans—no one is heard when alleging his own 
wrong—and international public policy).  
 212. See Eur. Cement Inv. & Trade S.A. v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/2, Award, ¶ 175 (Aug. 13, 2009) (analogizing Phoenix to find “a 
claim based on false assertion of ownership of an investment” an abuse of 
process); Waste Mgmt., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/3, ¶ 50 (refusing to end the 
proceedings as an abuse of process in the absence of such acts). Conduct 
prejudicial to procedural fairness provides the other occasion. See, e.g., Methanex 
Corp. (Canada) v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and 
Merits, UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 54 (Aug. 3, 2005) (NAFTA) (finding a duty to 
participate in good faith during arbitration proceedings under both general legal 
principles and the UNCITRAL Rules). 
 213. Phoenix Action, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, ¶ 151. 
 214. Because the claim was predicated upon Beno’s own wrongful acts, such 
dismissal was available and would not have necessitated the creation of another 
needless criterion for “investment,” thereby promoting a more coherent Article 25 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Posting of John Gaffney to Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/08/04 (Aug. 4, 2009) (proclaiming that 
the same outcome “would have been better achieved through the exercise of [this] 
inherent power”).  
 215. See Eur. Cement Inv. & Trade S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2, ¶ 175 
(awarding full costs to Respondent Turkey so as to “discourage others from 
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B. PROMOTION OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT WILL  
 ONLY OCCUR WHEN THE EXPRESSED INTENT OF CONTRACTING 
 PARTIES IS GIVEN ITS DUE WEIGHT, AND THUS, ICSID’S 
 JURISDICTION MUST LIE IN THE INTERSECTION OF ITS  MEMBER 
STATES’ BITS AND FTAS AND ITS OWN CONVENTION 
Investor reluctance is attributable to risk.216 While it is true that 
with risk comes reward, developing economies are especially 
susceptible to certain risks.217 The risk that foreign investors’ rights 
will not be respected greatly hinders the promotion of private 
international investment.218 ICSID seeks to assuage fear of this risk 
by enabling contracting parties to elect for impartial arbitration 
through its tribunals.219 But when ICSID tribunals fail to exercise 
jurisdiction over contracts with reasonable definitions of investment, 
uncertainty is reintroduced into the international system.220 Thus, to 
continue to promote private international investment, contracting 
parties’ expressed intentions should be given considerable weight. 
 
pursuing such unmeritorious claims”); Plama Consortium, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, ¶¶ 321-22 (making the claimant bear all costs as it was guilty of 
fraudulent misrepresentation). Nonetheless, awarding all costs is divergent 
from normal practice. See generally EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 322 (Oct. 8, 2009) (explaining that, in investment 
arbitration, parties historically have split costs evenly, regardless of outcome). 
 216. See Mary Hallward-Driemeier, DO BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
ATTRACT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT? ONLY A BIT . . . AND THEY COULD BITE 
3 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 3121, Aug. 2003), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/38XTI9OZ30 (emphasizing investors’ concerns about 
their ability “to earn - and control - a return on their investment”). 
 217. See BAKER, supra note 30, at 5-6 (citing as common problems: controls on 
ownership, “bureaucratic snafus” in project approval, quotas on employment of 
nationals, performance requirements, local political conditions, and financial 
restraints, such as financial regulations, insufficient foreign exchange, and heavy 
taxation). 
 218. See, e.g., Israel-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 4, pmbl. (acknowledging 
that a greater investment will not come without a reciprocal protection of the 
investment). 
 219. See BAKER, supra note 30, at 43 (pointing to the Centre’s advocates and 
their belief that such work would increase private foreign investment in less 
developed countries). 
 220. See, e.g., U.K.-Malaysia BIT, supra note 5, art. 7 (leaving the impacted 
party without remedy after the Decision on Jurisdiction, as ICSID was the only 
acceptable arbitration forum). See generally Mortenson, supra note 53, at 259 
(espousing that not exercising “jurisdiction over [certain] categories of enterprise  . 
. . compromises the credibility of states’ promises to protect them). 
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1. Foreign Nationals Will Not Engage in Private  Investment Unless 
Their Contractual Relationships Are Enforced with Predictability 
Arbitration outcomes are less predictable because tribunals give 
varying degrees of weight to the definitions of jurisdictional terms to 
which the parties have assented in their trade agreements.221 Without 
a clear sense of the investment disputes over which ICSID tribunals 
will likely exercise jurisdiction, foreign investors must account for 
the added risk that their investments may not be protected should a 
dispute regarding a jurisdictional “defect” arise; this risk is reflected 
as an additional cost.222 Moreover, when investments have negative 
net present values (“NPVs”) because of excessive legal risk, parties, 
assuming they are rational actors, do not invest.223 Accordingly, 
eliminating or reducing legal risk to investment through predictable 
 
 221. Compare Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARN/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001), reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003) 
(defining “investment” based on its hallmarks), with MHS Annulment, supra note 
11, ¶ 59 (defining “investment” through the definition established in the BIT). 
 222. See Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 788, 790 
(2004) (touting that “reliable and transparent conditions” provided by BITs 
“reduce the costs of investing abroad, including risk premia”). 
 223. See Jiang Wang, Chapter 14: Capital Budgeting, in 15.407 FINANCE 
THEORY 14–1, 14–3 (2003), available at http://web.mit.edu/15.407/file/Ch14.pdf 
(posing three investment criteria: for a single project, invest if NPV is positive; for 
many independent projects, invest in all projects with positive NPVs; and for 
mutually exclusive projects, invest in the project with the highest positive NPV). 
This situation can be illustrated using a simple example at t=0: 
There is a known oil reserve in Washingtonia that its government has agreed 
to let A, a juridical person of Alandia, explore. Alandia and Washingtonia 
have a BIT expressly calling for ICSID arbitration. The Government of 
Washingtonia is notorious for confiscating oil after it has been extracted (this 
occurs with probability 1). Additionally, A incurs expenses of $7 to extract 
the oil. 
Situation 1 (80% Chance of Enforcement): with probability 4/5, ICSID 
exercises jurisdiction, A’s rights are enforced, and A receives an award of 
$10; with probability 1/5, ICSID fails to exercise jurisdiction because oil 
extraction does not constitute an “investment.” NPV of Situation 1: (4/5)($10) 
- $7 = $1 > 0; provided there are no better alternatives, the investment is 
made. 
Situation 2 (60% Chance of Enforcement): same as Situation 1, but with 
probability 3/5, ICSID exercises jurisdiction. NPV of Situation 2: (3/5)($10) - 
$7 = -$1 < 0; no investment is made. 
See id. at 14-19 (providing a similar example over a two-period investment 
horizon). 
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contract enforcement increases projects’ NPVs, and thus promotes 
investment.224   
2. Extending ICSID’s Jurisdiction to the Intersection of Its 
Convention and the Relevant Member States’ BITs and FTAs Will 
Ensure Consistent Definition of Jurisdictional Terms 
ICSID tribunals should extend jurisdiction to the “outer limits” of 
the Convention; that is, they should exercise jurisdiction over all 
investment disputes that are not clearly inconsistent with the 
Convention.225 Moreover, since the relevant BIT or FTA is the 
clearest manifestation of the parties’ intent, it should serve as the 
limiting factor, narrowing the scope of jurisdiction to disputes 
consistent with its purposes.226 The exercise of jurisdiction in this 
manner accords with the travaux preparatoires and, more 
importantly, gives appropriate deference to the parties as required by 
the fundamental element of consent.227  
 
 224. Cf. Egger & Pfaffermayr, supra note 222, at 790, 801 (concluding that BIT 
ratifications result in real outward foreign direct investment (FDI) increases of  15-
20%). See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really 
Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 
46 HARV. J. INT’L L. 67, 104 (2005) (concluding that BITs should be used in 
conjunction with strong domestic legal institutions). 
 225. See Broches, supra note 74, at 362 (affording parties discretion when their 
actions are consistent with the Convention). See generally Mortenson, supra note 
53, at 261 (arguing that acceptable definitions should include all those that “are 
[not] so disconnected from meaningfully economic activity so as to be absurd”).  
 226. See, e.g., U.K.-Malaysia BIT, supra note 5, art. 1(1)(b)(ii) (restricting U.K. 
“investments” to those which the Malaysian government has approved). More 
importantly, most BITs and FTAs postdate the Convention and thus must be 
integrated into it for complete interpretation. See Vienna Convention, supra note 
83, art. 31(2) (merging all parties’ subsequent agreements and practices that are 
involved in the interpretation of the treaty). 
 227. See Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 
¶¶ 312, 314, 316 (July 24, 2008) (expressing the drawbacks of formalistic 
requirements and electing to use a “more flexible and pragmatic approach”). The 
Biwater tribunal was also troubled by the lack of a historical basis for such a test: 
They do not appear in the ICSID Convention. On the contrary, it is clear from 
the travaux preparatoires of the Convention that several attempts to 
incorporate a definition of ‘investment’ were made, but ultimately did not 
succeed. In the end, the term was left intentionally undefined, with the 
expectation (inter alia) that a definition could be the subject of agreement as 
between Contracting States. 
Id. ¶ 312. For a historical analysis rejecting the restrictive, or objective, approach, 
see Mortenson, supra note 52, at 260 (concluding that the three core Salini criteria 
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Also, because most BITs and FTAs contain similar language, a 
body of jurisprudence constante would likely emerge.228 Once the 
“outer limits” of the Convention and the restrictions of common BIT 
and FTA provisions had been delineated, parties would know with 
far greater certainty what qualified as a protected investment and 
could then construct their contracts accordingly.229 Additionally, 
states would not feel constrained in their ability to regulate domestic 
matters for fear of future disputes.230 Such efficiency and social 
ordering is the very purpose of the rule of law.231 Thus, stable 
jurisprudence would enable contracting parties to get exactly what 
they bargained for and, as a result, would induce greater 
investment.232   
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to rectify the current state of affairs in ICSID 
jurisprudence, concrete changes must be made to the process by 
 
“were explicitly considered and rejected during the drafting process”).   
 228. See AES Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 17-33 (Apr. 26, 2005) (concluding that fact-specific, BIT-limited 
decisions often rule out the use of binding precedent); Andrea K. Bjorklund, The 
Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1269, 
1294 (2008) (charging that well-reasoned opinions carry weight within the ICSID 
system because they are considered to have “practical precedential value”). See 
generally Vargiu, supra note 43, at 767-68 (explaining the workings of a 
jurisprudence constante—which is similar to the French civil-law tradition—and 
how it might apply to ICSID). 
 229. But see Bjorklund, supra note 228, at 1295 (maintaining that the sheer 
number of different BITs and provisions precludes anything but BIT-specific 
analysis). 
 230. See KONRAD VON MOLTKE & HOWARD MANN, TOWARDS A SOUTHERN 
AGENDA ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 30 (International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, Discussion Paper May 2004), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_sai.pdf (detailing the phenomenon 
known as “regulatory chill”). Regulatory chill results in necessary regulatory 
measures being delayed or not implemented at all for fear of potential disputes. Id. 
 231. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Is Consistency a Myth?, in PRECEDENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 137, 144-45 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi 
eds., 2008) (contending that, according to legal theory, one cannot have the rule of 
law without rules, which come through precedent). 
 232. See Report on the Convention, supra note 9, at 28 (returning inevitably to 
the notion of consent). 
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which tribunals resolve claims.233 Part III.A presents the idea that, in 
keeping with the consent requirement and legislative history, parties 
should be allowed great leeway to define “investment” in their trade 
agreements.234 Part III.B calls for the establishment of precedent, at 
minimum a jurisprudence constante, which would result in 
modifications to and restraints on existing powers, while also 
affording greater predictability and, thereby, promoting private 
international investment.235   
A. CONTRACTING PARTIES OUGHT TO HAVE INCREASED 
 DISCRETION IN DEFINING WHAT CONSTITUTES “INVESTMENT” 
 FOR THE PURPOSES OF THEIR AGREEMENTS 
Because the drafters of the Convention could not come to a 
consensus, the term “investment” was never defined.236 Given the 
essential requirement of consent in the ICSID Convention 
framework, the drafters believed that contracting parties themselves 
could draft acceptable definitions.237 The tension inherent in ICSID’s 
jurisprudence on “investment” now is merely reflective of the 
tension inherent at the time of the Convention’s drafting.238   
This tension could be relieved entirely if parties were given more 
discretion to define the terms of their agreements.239 Like the Israel–
Czech Republic BIT rightly notes, stimulation of individual business 
initiative is central to the promotion of greater investment.240 In the 
 
 233. See generally Franck, supra note 134, at 1521-23 (arguing that present 
efforts are insufficient and thus preventative and corrective measures must be 
made). 
 234. See discussion infra Part III.A (focusing on the wishes of the parties and 
their role in stimulating international development). 
 235. See discussion infra Part III.B (proposing precedent is necessary to ensure 
regularity). 
 236. See Broches, supra note 74, at 362 (“[T]he effort to devise a generally 
acceptable definition of the term ‘investment’ was abandoned ‘given the essential 
requirement of consent by the Parties.’”) (citation omitted). 
 237. Report on the Convention, supra note 9, at 28. 
 238. See SCHREUER, supra note 40, at 121-25 (detailing the extent of the 
discussions had over the term "investment" and the drafters' inability to 
come to an agreement on its definition). 
 239. Provided that these were arms-length transactions, the contracting parties 
would get the benefit of their bargain. 
 240. See Israel-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 4, at pmbl. (claiming that it will 
not only “stimulat[e] . . . individual business initiative,” but “will increase 
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absence of specific evidence to the contrary, treaty texts are the only 
safe guide to the common intent of the parties.241 Respect for their 
intentions will only engender the feeling that their “individual 
business initiative” is worth effecting.242 Moreover, given the fact 
that member states support ICSID’s operation financially and that 
ICSID arbitration is quite expensive, it seems unlikely that rampant 
abuse would ensue.243 Therefore, two contracting parties should be 
given reasonable discretion to define “investment” for the purposes 
of their contract, and thus ICSID.244   
B. ICSID MUST ESTABLISH SOME FORM OF PRECEDENT 
Together, Phoenix and MHS stand for the proposition that ICSID 
jurisprudence is inconsistent.245 But on top of the problem of 
inconsistency, tribunal awards are not “subject to any appeal or to 
any other remedy except those provided for in th[e] Convention.”246 
The current ICSID Convention provides only for rectification, 
 
prosperity in both States”). 
 241. See Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 
Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary Objections on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, ¶ 107 (Apr. 18, 2008) (failing to be persuaded that any rule of treaty 
interpretation gives the ICSID Convention interpretative supremacy). 
 242. See Dr. Edward Younkins, Freedom to Contract, LIBERTY FREE PRESS, 
June 15, 2000, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/younkins25.html (arguing that a free 
contract system, unrestricted from undue judicial interference, encourages 
“dynamic processes and technological achievements by permitting entrepreneurs to 
quickly and flexibly experiment with new ways of satisfying wants”). 
 243. See ICSID, Schedule of Fees, ¶¶ 1, 4 (2008), available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org (charging $20,000 for the mere constitution of an 
arbitration tribunal); Bjorklund, supra note 231, at 1275 (stating that PSEG v. 
Turkey cost $20,851,636.62 and arbitration for UPS v. Canada lasted seven years 
(citations omitted)). 
 244. But see Report on the Convention, supra note 9, at 28 (asserting that 
consent alone is insufficient to bring a dispute within ICSID’s jurisdiction); MHS 
Annulment, supra note 11, ¶ 63 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (charging that a 
“subjectivist view” may make ICSID “just another arbitration institution, 
competing with a range of others”). 
 245. But see POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR ICSID 
ARBITRATION 15 (ICSID Secretariat, Discussion Paper Oct. 2004), available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) [hereinafter IMPROVEMENTS] 
(asserting boldly that “significant inconsistencies have not . . . been a general 
feature of the jurisprudence of ICSID”). 
 246. ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 53(1). 
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interpretation, revision, and annulment.247 In addition, it limits the 
grounds for annulment to five cases: (1) the original “[t]ribunal was 
not properly constituted”; (2) the tribunal “manifestly” exceeded its 
powers; (3) a member was corrupt; (4) there was a major procedural 
error; or (5) the award does not state its rationale.248 Notably, mistake 
of law or fact is not grounds for annulment.249 An annulment 
proceeding is the last opportunity to challenge an ICSID award 
before it becomes enforceable as a matter of law.250 
In the absence of a broader review structure, the most plausible 
solution is precedent.251 While binding precedent could quell the 
inconsistencies in ICSID jurisprudence, it would require an 
amendment to the Convention.252 Moreover, certain treaties, such as 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, preclude its use.253 For 
these reasons, a jurisprudence constante presents an attractive 
alternative.254 
Given the infeasibility of broader structural reform, establishment 
of a jurisprudence constante currently presents the best option.255 A 
jurisprudence constante is appealing because it focuses on the text—
the correct starting point for analysis.256 Tribunals could then review 
 
 247. See generally Christian J. Tams, An Appealing Option? The Debate About 
an ICSID Appellate Structure, in ESSAYS IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 5-8 
(No. 57, June 2006) (detailing the remedies presently available under the 
Convention). 
 248. ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 52(1). 
 249. Franck, supra note 134, at 1547. 
 250. ICSID Convention, supra note 2, art. 54(1). 
 251. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 231, at 147 (advocating for precedent as 
“the main tool to promote efficiency”). 
 252. See IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 245, at 14-16 (expressing concern that an 
appeals process might lead to further fragmentation—in addition to the Convention 
and the existing Additional Facility Rules). 
 253. See Bjorklund, supra note 228, at 1295 (questioning whether there is any 
“system” of international arbitration and concluding international arbitration is too 
young to establish precedent). 
 254. See Vargiu, supra note 43, at 768 (proclaiming a jurisprudence constante 
to be the only solution). 
 255. Other commentators have suggested that an “investment arbitration court” 
oversee appellate litigation from various arbitration tribunals throughout the world. 
See, e.g., Franck, supra note 134, at 1617-21 (suggesting a court created through a 
pooling of procedures from the New York, Panama, and ICSID Conventions). 
 256. See Bjorklund, supra note 228, at 1295 (suggesting that analysis would 
occur much like interpretation of the civil code). 
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previous decisions interpreting the same text.257 Inconsistent 
decisions would be ignored or annulled.258 Over time, a consistent 
line of cases would emerge.259 Such practice could develop into 
customary international law.260   
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, ICSID tribunals are in the same position that the 
drafters of the Convention were in; they are unable to agree on the 
definition of “investment.” But the drafters also realized the solution 
lay in giving deference to the parties involved. In construing 
“investment” for ICSID arbitration, tribunals must ensure that their 
definitions comport with the expressed will of the parties. Moreover, 
consistently ruling in favor of investment protection and in favor of 
jurisdiction signals to investors that their rights are, in fact, protected. 




 257. See id. (assuming well-reasoned decisions would be persuasive). 
 258. See Vargiu, supra note 43, at 768 (designating the process of annulment as 
a consequence of going against the jurisprudence constante); Bjorklund, supra 
note 228, at 1297 (contending that “unfit [decisions] will perish”). 
 259. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 231, at 146-47 (reasoning that 
precedents foster consistency when tribunals “systematically rely on a consistent 
line of cases and depart from it only for compelling reasons”). 
 260. See id. at 147 (citing Thomas Walde for the proposition that customary 
international law “impl[ies] a well-established practice and an opinio juris”). 
